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he notion of a ‘Will to Power’ is foundational for 
Friedrich Nietzsche, both through his use of it as an 
explanation for ressentiment as well as for cosmologi-
cal, biological, and psychological phenomena.I II 
While Arthur Schopenhauer had previously posited 
that humans aim primarily for self preservation, Nietzsche sought 
to correct his predecessor’s views by stating that instead of a de-
sire to maintain one’s existence, humans (as well as all other life 
forms) seek to improve it.III That is, Nietzsche viewed the Will to 
Power as a desire not simply to preserve a state of being; instead, 
he viewed it is a drive to extend one’s power by “discharg[ing] 
strength.”IV In fact, “as a fundamental instinct of life,” the Will to 
Power “aims at the expansion of power and, wishing for that, fre-
quently risks and even sacrifices self-preservation.”V Although 
there are many potential manifestations of this concept, this essay 
will focus on the psychological interpretation of the Will to Pow-
er and attempt to exactly asses the conditions and ends which sat-
isfy its drive.  
Nietzsche’s writing seems to indicate that the acquisition of 
dominion itselfVI is what satisfies a will to power. That being said, 
power can only be procured effectively when certain conditions 
have been met, indicating that the validation of effectiveness must 
necessarily also compromise the Will to Power.VII This essay will 
contend that the acquisition of dominion is not enough to satisfy a 
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Will to Power and must be coupled with the feeling of successful-
ly applying one’s abilities. This conclusion can be reached by as-
sessing why certain endsVIII are satisfying yet still produce frus-
tration in others and why the Will to Power is insatiable. Moreo-
ver, the practical consequences that manifest from the acquisition 
of dominion are derived contextually by the values a given indi-
vidual has and the manifestation of power that they strive to ob-
tain. The implication of this is that the Will to Power describes 
the insatiable human drive to acquire dominion while validating a 
feeling of effectiveness through the active procurement of power 
against a resisting force. This essay will begin by discussing the 
possibility that dominion is itself the final end of the will to pow-
er before offering the suggestion that the acquisition of any power 
is satisfying insofar as it helps validate an individual’s capacity 
by evoking a feeling of success.  
 
Dominion as the End of the Will to Power  
 It seems most immediately plausible that Nietzsche be-
lieves the Will to Power can be satisfied by the acquisition of 
“dominion.” That is, he describes how the Will to Power compels 
individuals to become “master over the forces of nature, master 
over his own savagery and licentiousness.”IX In this essay, domin-
ion will be utilized as a term to describe the procurement of mas-
tery, domination, and control of an object or individual.X While 
the concepts of dominion may hold a negative connotation that 
links it to callousness, brutality, and authoritarian domination,XI it 
is a fundamentally neutral idea for Nietzsche whose meaning is 
derived from its contextual manifestations. This is to say that do-
minion is the imposition of an individual’s values on some object, 
ultimately shaping it to conform to the desires of that individual. 
As Nietzsche put it, “[t]hat is your whole will, you who are wis-
est: a Will to Power—when you speak of good and evil too, and 
of valuations. You still want to create the world before which you 
can kneel…” XII 
As a consequence, any moral evaluation of the acquisition of 
dominion is contingent on the values and aspirations that manifest 
in an individual’s Will to Power. For instance, a politician seek-
ing political office with the intention of reducing income inequali-
ty and economic injustice may be subject to a completely differ-
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ent moral evaluation than if she sought to consolidate power by 
propagating the hatred of minority groups. While the manifesta-
tions in each case would seemingly be very different, the politi-
cian is still engaging with the same notion of dominion by at-
tempting to impose her values externally. Beyond this, it seems 
feasible that attempts at acquiring dominion can be made for both 
external objects as well as internal conditions. For example, while 
a businessperson might attempt to increase her revenue in order to 
acquire external dominion, a Buddhist monk might attempt to 
reach a kind of internal spiritual dominion through her religious 
pursuits. 
 However, the centrality of an individual’s values to the 
manifestation of dominion may be problematic since her beliefs 
and values ultimately determine the way in which dominion is 
acquired and applied. Given that, it seemingly follows that an in-
dividual cannot have dominion without those values. It would be 
impossible to conceptualize someone who truly had no values or 
ways in which she hoped the world might change; such a person 
would necessarily need to hold complete indifference to every 
aspect of her existence. In this case, there would be no object or 
content for that individual’s dominion to manifest as. Conse-
quently, values seem unequivocally essential to the capacity to 
acquire dominion and satisfy a Will to Power.  
 The chief issue that arises from this is one of redundancy: 
it does not appear necessary for Nietzsche to discuss the drive to 
acquire dominion as a necessary condition for the Will to Power 
if an individual’s values are ultimately what motivates her.XIII 
That is, it seems feasible to assert that the motivation for an in-
crease in dominion is not a desire for power or domination at all; 
instead, it may simply be the desire to see one’s values represent-
ed in a given object. However, if the desire for dominion is not 
what is practically motivating an individual, there need not be a 
reason for her to consider it as such. Nietzsche might as well have 
concluded that an individual’s values and desires are a sufficient 
motivation without needing to discuss the desire to dominate and 
extend mastery. For example, if an activist is working to create 
more acceptance of the LGBTQ+ community, that individual is 
attempting to impose her values externally not as a means to ac-
quire an increase in dominance and power, but instead as a means 
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to propagate beliefs that she maintains as important. To the activ-
ist, the spread of her values is important and desirable for them-
selves and not as a means to increase her power. If dominion is at 
all relevant in the will of this activist, it is at least secondary to 
her drive to see her values externalized, thus making a discussion 
of a Will to Power through dominion seem unhelpful. 
 However, this objection might be countered by asserting 
that, since the desire to see one’s values shape an object is central 
to the notion of dominion, it stands that an individual is still striv-
ing for dominion even if it is not a conscious objective. However, 
this response does not seem to be completely adequate; the Will 
to Power describes the motivation and drive towards ‘mastery, 
domination, and power’ over some object. However, if an indi-
vidual were only subconsciously engaging in a drive to acquire 
dominion, it would seem like a distinct reinterpretation of the 
Will to Power. Nietzsche ascribes a considerable amount of im-
portance to the motivational influence he believes is intrinsic to 
the Will to Power, making the assertion that it is only experienced 
as a subordinate drive seem like a contradiction of the notion that 
a satisfied will to dominate is ultimately what is gratifying. XIV 
 Even if this objection were to be disregarded entirely, the 
Will to Power understood as a drive towards dominion remains 
contestable. This is because Nietzsche provides two qualifications 
on the means through which a will to power is successfully exer-
cised: he states that an individual must activelyXV pursue his or 
her goals against a resistingXVI force. Indeed, as Nietzsche ex-
plains, "I assess the power of a will by how much resistance, pain 
and torture it endures and knows how to turn to its advantage."XVII 
An example he uses is the biblical myth of Adam and Eve, where 
God has provided all the necessities of life and allowed them to 
live as immortals prior to the “First Sin.” However, Nietzsche 
proclaims that the “innocent, idle, immortal, happy -- this concep-
tion [...] must be criticized above all.”XVIII This condemnation and 
belief that Adam and Eve are not actually engaged in a Will to 
Power is issued because their dominion was given to them by 
God and not earned through the criteria that Nietzsche has deline-
ated. That is, they did not actively participate in the process of 
acquiring dominion, nor have they faced opposition in the pro-
cess.XIX  
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If dominion is understood as the imposition of one’s values 
and desires on an object, it would not follow that it could be the 
end of the Will to Power alone. Nietzsche’s restrictions on the 
means by which dominion is achieved seems to contradict the no-
tion that dominion can itself satisfy the Will to Power. For exam-
ple, in the case of the social activist, it does not follow that the 
imposition of her values externally requires opposition in order to 
be satisfying. If Nietzsche believed that dominion is the ultimate 
end of the Will to Power, it is not clear why activity and opposi-
tion are treated as necessary conditions; mastery, control, and the 
imposition of values can exist without these requisites. Conse-
quently, there must be another aim of the Will to Power that is not 
satisfied by the acquisition of dominion alone, but rather by the 
means through which it is achieved.  
 
The Case for Effectiveness 
In order for dominion to be the end of a Will to Power that 
also satisfies the criteria Nietzsche ascribed, there must necessari-
ly be some other component of the Will to Power that is only sat-
isfied if an individual is actively engaged in a drive against an 
opposing force. That is, in order for Nietzsche’s criteria for a Will 
to Power to be consistent, that will must have an end that can be 
satisfied only through the means he identifies. In order for the cir-
cumstances in which dominion is achieved to be valuable in the 
appeasement of a Will to Power, those circumstances must be 
represented as part of the final end of the Will to Power. As this 
essay has attempted to illustrate, such a reality would not be true 
if dominion alone were the end. Instead, a drive to have one’s 
own effectiveness validated seems to be an essential component 
of a satisfied Will to Power. While dominion is the quality of 
having power over an object, effectiveness can be characterized 
as a capacity to perform a certain task or achieve a desired end. It 
is a validation of one’s own abilities and a means of gauging the 
success of an individual.XX  
One primary indication that effectiveness must be represented 
in a satisfied Will to Power in some capacity is that Nietzsche’s 
emphasis on resistance and activity is only consistent if efficacy 
is a desired end. In order for a feeling of effectiveness to be vali-
dated, an individual must psychologically feel as though she has 
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actively brought on her own success and overcome some obstacle 
to achieve it. They must feel as though they have utilized their 
own capacity and abilities in order to achieve the end. As Nie-
tzsche says, “[i]t is not the satisfaction of the will that causes 
pleasure […], but rather the will’s forward thrust and again and 
again becoming master over that which stands in its way.”XXI For 
example, the young adult who inherits wealth does not satisfy the 
Will to Power because she has not met resistance or actively 
brought on his success. In this case, the young adult has not uti-
lized her abilities or met opposition in the process of obtaining 
dominion, indicating that she has no reason to believe that she 
could continue to make money. That is, while she may have 
achieved an increase in dominion itself simply by having more 
financial resources, there is no reason for her to believe that she 
would be able to maintain this dominion and has therefore not 
psychologically satisfied the Will to Power. As a consequence, a 
feeling of effectiveness appears to be a necessary condition for a 
satisfied Will to Power.   
From this, it may seem to follow that dominion does not even 
need to be achieved in order to satisfy a Will to Power because 
the feeling of effectiveness alone fulfills the criteria of meeting 
opposition and active engagement. For instance, a freedom fighter 
who loses a hard-fought battle against a dominant force may have 
physically lost dominion, but she will have exercised her Will to 
Power insofar as the individual’s proficient fighting helped to val-
idate her effectiveness. However, this objection does not seem to 
be completely consistent with Nietzsche’s notion of a Will to 
Power.XXII Even if the freedom fighter had experienced a battle-
field loss, by surpassing expectations of her opponents as well as 
her own, she has acquired dominion: she has changed his external 
environment into a place in which her abilities are more respect-
ed. This indicates that the acquisition of dominion is still neces-
sary for a satisfied Will to Power; an assessment of success and 
effectiveness must be derived through an evaluation of one’s ac-
quisition of dominion. This relationship is important not only be-
cause a validation of effectiveness must necessarily correspond 
with an increase in dominion, but also because it offers an indica-
tion to an individual of their capacity to obtain more. 
Such a relationship can be illustrated in the psychological 
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consequences of not having a feeling of efficacy validated. For 
example, if a writer is provided with a positive public book re-
view as a gift from a friend, such a favor might help bolster the 
success of the publication; however, it would not validate the au-
thor’s effectiveness as a writer. On the contrary, it may leave the 
author in a precarious position, unsure of her abilities and capaci-
ty for success.XXIII According to Nietzsche, this failed Will to 
Power can result in a feeling of frustration, impotence, or self-
doubt.XXIV In this example, the writer has a desire to be respected 
for her talents, which indicates that she is assessing her efficacy 
through dominion. However, since the writer has not validated 
her effectiveness, she cannot expect to obtain the future dominion 
that she strives for through her writing. As a consequence, her 
Will to Power has not been satisfied.  
This also exemplifies the emphasis Nietzsche placed on suc-
cess in the face of adversity or competition as a criterion for a sat-
isfied Will to Power. For a Buddhist monk, this may manifest 
through success in battling appetitive inclinations within the 
mind, while this sort of competition may be achieved through 
thwarting rivals for a businessman. Nietzsche makes the point 
that the Will to Power requires the confrontation and overcoming 
of resistance overtly clear: “the Will to Power can manifest itself 
only against resistances; therefore, it seeks that which resists 
it.”XXV As a consequence, it seems that the Will to Power can on-
ly be satisfied through a feeling of accomplishment; that is, the 
genuine belief that one’s acquisition of dominion was a demon-
stration of one’s own skills and capacity for success. 
An additional point that is worth considering is why the feel-
ing of acquiring dominion and a validated capacity only needs to 
be a belief and not something that is overtly true. This is because 
many people can satisfy a Will to Power through self deception 
by conjuring an illusory conception of their own abilities and suc-
cesses. Such a reality can be partially attributed to the need for the 
intoxicating, perhaps euphoric feeling that comes from accom-
plishment, however contrived and delusional it is.XXVI For exam-
ple, in Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman, Willy frequently at-
tempts to conjure and fantasize over a deceptive assessment of his 
skills as an entrepreneur. He is actively attempting to avoid the 
immense disappointment and feelings of impotence that might 
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result from coming to terms with his perpetual failure. As Nie-
tzsche says, “[h]ere the experience of intoxication proved mis-
leading. This increases the feeling of power in the highest de-
gree—therefore, naively judged, power itself.”XXVII  
One way in which this kind of illusory Will to Power can be 
conjured is by reassessing one’s desires or convincing oneself 
that the failure was a result of external circumstances or foul play. 
For example, if a woman is attempting to succeed as a baseball 
player, yet is not judged as effective by her teammates and is sub-
sequently rejected, she may attempt to avoid the frustration of her 
Will to Power by pretending that she was not really driven to be-
come a baseball player. This is a way of limiting the feeling that 
she has failed at acquiring dominion (the desire to impose one’s 
values on an object); she denies that she ever had the values (the 
desire to play baseball) that she failed at acquiring. Alternatively, 
she might convince herself that players on the team conspired 
against her to remove her. Doing so also allows her to avoid hav-
ing to face the realization that her capacity as a baseball player is 
lacking. As a consequence, she prevents her effectiveness from 
being subject to criticism.XXVIII   
The importance of validating one’s own effectiveness to the 
Will to Power is also made clear through Nietzsche’s discussion 
of it as an insatiable drive; that is, “to [perpetually] have and to 
want to have more—growth.”XXIX Even if an individual were to 
ascend into an authoritarian political position and receive dicta-
torial authority and vast amounts of dominion, this position of 
extreme power would not be satisfying forever. According to Nie-
tzsche, this is a result of the human desire to attempt to improve 
themselves and experience new accomplishments, something that 
can only occur if an individual is expanding their dominion. 
While the kind of dictator mentioned in this example may look to 
further expand his power by conquering other territories, her pre-
dicament illustrates an important point about dominion: there is a 
finite amount of it. This is true in spite of Nietzsche’s contention 
that “the earth is large enough and man is sufficiently unexhaust-
ed.”XXX Even if she were to become a supreme leader, the desire 
to experience new accomplishments and further validate her ca-
pacities would still be a present and gnawing drive.   
This insatiability of the Will to Power can also help explain 
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the phenomenon of torture, which can be seen as a callous mani-
festation of this drive.XXXI In high positions of power, where there 
are fewer challenges through which an individual can validate her 
capacity, torture can be seen as a mechanism to engage with a 
Will to Power. That is, by subjecting individuals to something 
that will make them resist her, a torturer is exercising her capacity 
for dominance and induces her own satisfaction by overcoming 
this resistance. A torturer is acquiring more dominion by impos-
ing her sadistic desires on a resisting individual, thereby serving 
to validate her effectiveness and grant her a temporary thrill of 
accomplishment. 
 
Effectiveness as a Condition of Dominion  
While it may possible to assert that dominion serves as a 
means through which a feeling of efficacy can be obtained and a 
Will to Power satisfied, Nietzsche seems to believe that the con-
trary is true. That is, the characterization of domination as a 
means to satisfy the Will to Power indicates that Nietzsche be-
lieves dominion has qualities that also address the need to estab-
lish a feeling of efficacy. A way of reconciling this is to posit that 
Nietzsche believes dominion implicitly must contain a validation 
of effectiveness. That is, there is no “power over” (dominion) 
without also having the “power to” (efficacy) transform the world 
in accordance with one’s values.XXXII For example, a prince who 
inherits the title of king upon the death of his father has experi-
enced a tremendous increase in power; however, he only experi-
ences an increase in dominion if he has the skills to maintain this 
position and continue to conform the world to his will. This re-
quires that he is also effective at leadership and being king; other-
wise, he would never truly experience the full increase in domin-
ion that comes from becoming a monarch. As a consequence, 
Nietzsche’s notion of a Will to Power seems to be best under-
stood as the acquisition of dominion through the imposition of 
one’s values on an object and the validation of one’s efficacy and 
abilities. While the manifestations and ends of this will may vary, 
it is guided by the inexorable pursuit of the thrill that comes from 
a feeling of accomplishment. In this regard, Nietzsche’s Will to 
Power can be seen as not only a psychological explanation of a 
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I In this essay, all citations are direct from Nietzsche texts. The 
abbreviations are: BGE = Beyond Good and Evil, GM = On the 
Genealogy of Morality, GS = The Gay Science, WP = The Will 
to Power, and Z = Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
II WP §1067, BGE §259, BGE §23 
III Nietzsche, Friedrich (1965), Schopenhauer as Educator, trans. 
J.W. Hillesheim and Malcolm R. Simpson, (South Bend, Indiana, 
Gateway), pp. 25-26 
IV BGE§13 
V GS §349 
VI Increases in tangible power, domination, and control.  
VII By “dominion itself”, this essay seeks to draw the distinction 
between tangible increases in power and dominion that must be 
acquired in particular ways as well as distinguishing between do-
minion acquired as a means to something else.  
VIII By “end”, this essay is describing the manifestation of the 
Will to Power. For example, for a businessman, the end of his 
Will to Power might be an increase in revenue.    
IX WP §702 
X This definition was inspired by Professor Bernard Reginster’s 
March 8, 2016 lecture.  
XI For example, we might say that Adolf Hitler attempted to in-
crease his dominion in Europe. 
XII Z II §12 
XIII This objection was inspired by Professor Bernard Reginster’s 
March 8, 2016 lecture.  
XIV WP §423 
XV Here activity can be understood as an individual’s role as the 
initiation and driving force behind any obtained dominion.  
XVI That is, a force that stands to obstruct or oppose an individual 
Notes Continued 
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from satisfying his or her Will to Power.  
XVII WP §382 
XVIIIWP § 224  
XIX In order to even face opposition, it is a necessary condition 
that an individual is active.  
XX This definition was inspired by Professor Bernard Reginster’s 
March 8, 2016 lecture.  
XXI WP §696 
XXII This reply was inspired by a discussion with Professor Ber-
nard Reginster on March 17, 2016.  
XXIII WP §696 
XXIV Z II §12 
XXV WP §656 
XXVI WP §48 
XXVII WP §48 
XXVIII This is an essential component of what Nietzsche calls res-
sentiment.  
XXIX WP §125 
XXXWP §125 
XXXI This point was inspired my discussion with Professor Ber-
nard Reginster on March 12, 2016 lecture.  
XXXII BGE §259 
XXI WP §696 
XXII This reply was inspired by a discussion with Professor Ber-
nard Reginster on March 17, 2016.  
XXIII WP §696 
XXIV Z II §12 
XXV WP §656 
XXVI WP §48 
XXVII WP §48 
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